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Summary of Major Events and Problems
Intelligence, Security, and Safety Office
Office of the Chief of Ordnance
Department of the Army
1 January - 30 June 1953

This is a digital version of a portion of a report. As the
name indicates the Intelligence, Security, and Safety Office
(IS&S) had diverse responsibilities within the Office of the
Chief of Ordnance (OCO). That report is in the National
Archives, Record Group 156: "Records of the Office of the
Chief of Ordnance ... Histories of Staff and Operating Offices
and Divisions of the Chief of Ordnance, 1946-1954, IS&S
Office, July 195 thru June 1953," Box C 8.
This is a digital version of the sections of the document
concerning the Technical Intelligence Branch within the
IS&S. Those pages were copied by Robert Bolin at the
National Archives in the early 1990s.
Personal Note: I was interested in Army Technical
Intelligence and not in other activities of the Ordnance Corps.
Other material about the history of the Ordnance Corps is
available at the National Archives. - Bob Bolin
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INTRODUCTION

The mission of the 15&5 Office from 1 Janu~ 1953 through 30 June 1953
remained unchanged (Current functional sheet attached as Appendix A, Incl. 1).
Facilities
The facilit,ies available to 18&8 Office were, in general, adequate.
However during the summer months the office space assigned to the Technical
Intelligence Branch on the fourth floor of the Pentagon Annex No.2 is
inadequate.

This office space is

direct~

under a flat, tarred roof and

the temperature and humidity frequently reached a point where it is
unbearable.

Therefore personnel in the Technical Intelligence Branch had to

be released during such periods of unbearable heat and humidity.

JA project

was initiated to air condition this office space, the equipment was procured,
but funds for installation of the equipment were not available.
equipment has been in st,orage since October 1952.

The

The inadequacy of this

facility creates a health hazard, an unnecessary loss of manhours, retards
production of intelligence and the accomplishment of this branchls assigned
mission.

The cost involved in the installation of air-conditioning would be

compensated for, by the full efficiency of the personnel working in this
facility without loss of manhours for which they are compensated

unnecessari~

due to a situation be.yond the control of this office.
Activities
The Executive Administration Office continued to function

normal~

during the period, such as procurement of personnel, discussions on 1955
budget es·liimates, and general office administration, etc.

Personnel

On 1 Januar.y 1953 an authorized strength of 58 civilians and 14
officers was allocated to this office, reflecting an increase ofl
civilian. and

5 officers.

The bulk of the officer spaces were provided the

Provost Harsha]. Branch to complete that staff' in order to carry out the'
Provost Harshal functions and mission charged to the Chief of Ordnance.
The increase of 1 civilian has not relieved the inadequac.y reported durLig

the previous reporting period.

II T.ECHNICAL

INT~LICENCE

Background
The mission of the Technical Intelligence Branch might be summed
up briefly as that of procuring, collatinG, evaluating, producing, and
disseminating intelligen ce concerning Cl.ll foreign ordncn ce capabilities.
This function is required of all Technical Services under the Army
Intelligence Program.
The ancestor of the Technical Intelligence Bl-'anch

W2S

the IvIilitary

Intelligence Section of the Research and Engineering Division, which
1-Jas afforded little opportunity to fulfill this mission 'lrJhen it was
founded back in the late 1930 t s.

A minor storehouse of reports, most

of which were obsolescent and of little ordnc'Dce value, the unit
suffered from a shor tage of channels of information and an almost
complete absence of direct liaison with these channels.

Following the

establishment of separate intelligence organizations for each technical
servi ce in August 1940" the Ordnan ce Nili tary Intelligen ce Section vIas
enlarged and was assigned the mission of collating, digesting, and
disseminating Ordnance intelligence derived from Nilitary Attache

1/

reports.-

In June 1942 the unit "HaS raised in status to the Technica1

Intelligence Branch to coordinate its activities vlith the nevlly created
Ordnance Intelligence Teams; the unit continued to expand 1-Jithout any
major change in organiz2.tion until the close of 1'.[orld vJar II.

Technical Intelligence

L~anch

was reduced to a section; its production

unit was decreased from thirty-three employees to seven, its collection
and dissemination unit to one employee -- notwithstanding the fact
that some 2,500 Ordnance intelligence reports continued to flow into
the unit each month.

The section operated during the inmlediate post-

war years in what might be termed a shadowland of Ordnance intelligence.
The unit somehow m2.naged to pass along ini'onl1ation of foreign
developments to interested offices, but it was impossible for the
handful of employees to collate and evaluate the mounting storehouse
of raw intelligence into basic and staff intelligence.

The commencement

of the National Intelligence Survey Program in 1948 placed the Ordnance
Corps in the embarrassing position of being unable to furnish its segment
of intelligence, as required of all technical services.

On the eve of

the Korean operation, the section was supplying about 10% of the material
requested by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Bet'V18en 10,000 and

15,000 foreign and domestic reports were stored without adequate index

cards, so that the section was two to three months behira in filling
requests for these reports.

31

The advent of hos tilities in Korea found the Ordnance Corps unable
to evaluate the enenyt s materiel or its ordnance capacity_

On 18 July

1950 Ordnance Corps Order Number 27-50 was issued to make a long ovel--o.ue

correction of a bad situation and to preclude the reoccurrence of this

31 See

letter to Civilian Executive Officer, OCO, from Chief, Technical
Intelligence Section, in Ord. Tech. Int. Branch files.
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state of affairs.

Again elevated to branch status, the Intelligence

Branch (since renamed the Technical Int.elligence Bran ch) was placed
along

~lith

the Security and Safety Branches in the newly created

IS&S Office.

Its enlarged Collection and Dissemination Section

immediately corrnnenced the operation of cataloging and abstracting
the tremendoud 'backlog of old intelligence and the ever mounting
number of new repo rts.

The section 1-IaS char ged under the new

organization 'With procuring and distributing all availa.ble technical
intelligence reports pertinent to the Ordnance corps; maintaining a
library of the se reports, and an appropriate locating system; conducting
liaison with G-2 and other intelligence offices' in the \'lashington area
and arranging for the mutual exchange of intelligence information; and
numerous other co ordina ting functions.

An exan pIe of the s cope of the

unit t S operations can be gleaned from the fact that by the end of 1952
approximately 50,000 documents had been circulated and distributed and
some 1,500 individual requests for reports on Ordnance information had
been satisfied.
The branchts Technical Intelligence Section (since rene'lued the
Nateriel Section) was assigned the task of collecting, maintaining,
producing, and dissenlinating technical intelligence concerning the
capabilities, performance, design, and development of foreign ordnance
materiel.

The section was also charged with the r esponsibility of

providing technical guidance for Ordnance Technical Intelligence reams
and preparing technical aids required for the maximum exploitation and
use of ordnance materiel.

Additional duties incl uded coordination with
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Intel Subcomrnittoo materiel
GA~loitation

program, and maintenance of inventory records for the

colla tion of requirements, receipt, and disposition of all captured
foreign materiel needed by the Ordnm ce Corps for intelligence and test
purposes.

The Nateriel Section is augmented by the branch 1 s Ordnance

Technical Intelligence Office, located at .Aberdeen Proving Ground.

Y

By the end of 1952, the two units had issued 28 works on Soviet ordnance
rnatel'iel.

The se included II firing tables for mortars and field,

4 users t

antiaircra.ft, and co mba t vehicle artillery j

guides for ma.chine

guns and mortars; 8 pamphlets dealing with anununition markings,
ammunition interchangeability, and weapons field stripping;

4

training

charts on rifles, machine guns, 8.nd antitank rifles; and a catalog of
all known typ::; s of Soviet cunmunition.
The branchls Strategic Section (since

l'en~ned

the Logistics

Section) was established in order to furnish the Ordn2nce segment of
intelligen ce required of all technical services under the
Intelligence Program.

l~rmy

In addition to producing intelligence specifically

reQuested by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, under this program, the
section was also ch2,rged with the r esponsibili ty of compiling country
studies of evaluated intelligence on foreign ordnance holdings; supply
and storage, maintenance, manufact.uring facilities, research and
development, and all factors that would affect Ordnance opera tions
a.broad.

The need for such a service had been foreseen by the Chief of

11 See

Appendix B, Inclosure 1
Intelligence Branch.

Organization ChcTt, Technical
...., ,

~

..... :

1~

':--" ...., .....-- 1

~.

·

4/

Ordnance lonb before the commencement of Korean operations-, but budget

mid-1950. By tho end

limitat.ions had precluded its establishment until
of

1952 the Logistics Section had compiled IS

ordn~ce

countr,y studies,

of which the more important were published and distributed to Department
of Defense offices roncerned.

The others were retained in draft fonn

in the section file s for future us e in Ordna.YJ. ce ope ration planning and
plan execution.

In fulfillment of the Army Intelligence ProgI'arn, the

11 NIS contributions and numerous

Logistics Section had produced

reports, 0-2 Intelligence RevieH articles, and special studies.

1 January -

30 June 1953

The first six months of the year

1953 constituted a period in

which operations continued generally unchanged, except for revisions
instituted to perfect office techniques, and improve unit services.
The COlle ction and Dissanination Section compiled an SOP covering all
phases of the section 1 s opsrations.

Four months Vlore required to

complete the manual, wrJ.ch is 349 pa.ges in length.

This work, together

with an up-to-date functj,onal chart, has greatly simplified vlork
procedures, has standardized or:erations wherever pos sible and has afforded
the section 1 s personnel ready access to the dctDils of everyday procedure
and office poliqr.

During this .period the section received, cataloged,

abstracted, and circulated within the Ordnance Corps over 12,000 reports)

J:/ 8ee

letter from Chi'3f of Ordnance to Intelligence Division, dtd
19~.8, in Ord. Int. Branch files.

8 September
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'Were routed to the production soctionso! the
.branch.

The unit also processed almost 500 requests' for information

from offices outside of the branch, and performed numorous functions
necessary for the efficient or;eration of an intelligence collection
and dissemination facility.
The Nateriel Section, in conjunction with the Ordnance Technical
Intelli[;ence Office at Aberdeen Proving Ground) continued the production
of technical publications in addition to it s other duties.
period, Volume X of Section I (USSR) of the DepartmerrG of
on Foreign lVIilitary

~'!eapons

11a3 produced.

During this
An~y

pamplet

Other publications included

the Soviet Fuze Hanual; the Soviet Projectile Identification Guide;
COmplete Hound Data for Soviet Arr:munition, Bombs, Grenades, and Rockets;
a..l1d contributions to the Frankford Arsenal :tvremorandum on Hetallurgical
Examination of Soviet C2rtI'idge Gases, the vJa tertm'ln Laboratory B.eports
on l'letallurgical Examination on Soviet Production, and the G-2
Intelligence I?eview.

A special text on Soviet rifles and carbines 'Has

receiving final editing at the Aberdeen OTIO at the end of June.

A

compilation of items of captured m2teI'iel needed by the Ordnance Corps
for intelligence and test purpos es·

1rJaS

completed" and the first lis t

·was published and distributed on 1 July·195-;3.

This project will be

continued in order to keep field colle etion agencies informed of current
requirements; a second list is scheduled to be published and distributed
early in October

1953.
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Tho LogisticD Sectlon, during thin pe.r1od J fOl"'wnrded 'to tho
office tHO 1'118 contributions on Conununist China, and one each for
BulE;aria, Burma, Nationalist China, Iraq, and Poland.

NIS contributions

on six other countries were being prepared at the end of June.

The

section also reviewed drafts for the Ordnance portion of Series A
Handbooks on France, Turkey, and Yugoslavia; submitted two feature
article s to the G-2 Intelligence Review; wrote spe cial reports as
requested by G-2; briefed and debriefed Nilitary Attaches and l'1.li.A.G
personnel; and compiled an SOP for the Logistics Section.

An ordnance

country study on Portugal was published and dissern.inated during the
first half of the year and a similar work on the Netherlands Has in the
hands of the printer at the close of the period.

At the end of June,

country studies were being readied for publication on NorvJay, Italy,
and the Communist. Zone of Germany.

A study on the United Kingdom was

awaiting final review, pending the receipt of information requested
from the Nilitary Attache; country studies were also being prepared on
Communist China and Bulgaria.
Unsolved Branch Pro ble.ms
The outstanding Cl..t.'1d apparently unsurmountable obstacle th1Varting
liE

ximum efficienCiJ continues to be the shortage of p;:;rsonnel a t various

levels.

In spite of every effort by the supervisory staff to streamline

procedures and eliminate extraneous operations, the continuation of the
rigid perso nnel ceiling had hindered the implementation of several basic
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only slightly-lesa cSBontul..

Supervisors and Intelligence <ape

are .frequently compelled to type their reports and to perform other
incidential duties because of the shortage of typists and clerks.
The Collection and Dissemination Section is unable to prepare

an inventor.y of all file cases and to properly retire obsolete files
to the Archives.

The section has also been unable to keep its locator

system reasonably current.
'lne Nateriel Section, f'8ced with the task of covering all foreign

Ordnan ce materiel

-vu th

a staff of only five Research S],:€ cialists, has

concentrated on equipment of the USSH.

The coverage of ordnance materiel

of other countries -- Satellite, friendly, and neutral -- has suffered
accordingly.

A partial solution to this problem, but hardly a

satisfactory one, has been a chieved by condoning the performance of
some functions in other offices less qualified to produce Ordnance
intelligence.

Thus, the fields of mines and explosives are covered

by the Intelligence Branch of the Engineer Corps.

exists in the Logistics Section.

A similar situation

The NIS segment dealing with the

armament industry is being produced elsevlhere, notwithstanding the fact
that this section is best qualified to produce the

Ie

quired intelligence.

A ITk.1intenance prograrll on Ordnan ce country studies cannot be instituted
because of the higher priority assigned to the production of new countxy
studies and the fulfillment of G-2 requests under the Army Intelligence
Program.

Moreover, fifteen countlY studies on areas of lesser
~.~

•..
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i .

n
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In spite,of tho 'personnel shortages; and the.sdveroo'eumar.or:
working conditions in Pentagon Annex II, the Technical Intelligence
Branch is continuously improving its production effort so far as quality
and quantity is concerned.

This has been made possible, by the

selection of employees more than casually interested in their ,-lork J
by the emphasis placed upon personnel training, and by the constant

effort to devise better methods to accomplish the branch mission.
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